ABSTRACT In the paper we present a reliability-based mapping scheme for underlying erroneous human behavior recognition with the intention of retrospective operational audit and safety management in nuclear power plants. For implementing the reliability-based mapping scheme, a success-oriented GO-FLOW method is applied to model, quantify and identify the erroneous human behaviors and associated system configuration changes. The retrospective investigation of human error is illustrated with a simulated example case event of loss of dual residual heat removal pumps during the refueling outage of nuclear power plants. The case study shows that human-system configuration changes in multiple task sequences can be easily captured by GO-FLOW method for post-hoc reviewing analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of digital information and computer technology has pushed big shifts to the intelligent industrial applications [1] . The large risk-taking industries even for the very conservative nuclear facilities have also accelerated their upgrade programme for the instrumentation and control systems in recent years [2] , [3] . Along with the popular applications of digital information technology, vast operating data would be generated and need to be processed during the operation of nuclear power plants. The large mass of operational data information could be good or bad to human task performance and operational performance of nuclear power plants [4] . Ideally, appropriate amount of valuable information should be prepared and presented via the human-machine system so that plant operators can effectively monitor the operation of nuclear power plants without bearing too much mental workloads. To ensure the continuous availability and safety of nuclear power plants, the concept of operator support system has been extensively promoted and integrated into the new main control room design for
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Lorenzo Ciani. supporting operator's performance in complex tasks [5] , [6] . The operator support systems are typically designed and offered with a collection of capabilities in data acquisition, safety critical parameter display, alarm analysis, fault diagnostic reasoning, computerized operating procedures, risk monitoring, operator response validation and human-system interface design etc. so as to provide a sound operational, diagnostic, monitoring, maintenance assistance and assurance in nuclear power plants [7] - [13] . It is currently moving towards a computerized, intellectual and informative direction [14] . The latest developments of intelligent operator support systems are concentrating mostly on the efficiently data structuring to increase their relevance to given situations and to enhance the plant operator's situation awareness [14] - [17] .
Meanwhile, human factor engineering is considered for the ecological interface design of advanced main control room in assisting with human behavioral assessment as well as improving the overall plant operational performance [18] , [19] . One of the most widely used approach for characterizing human behaviors and performances is the step-ladder model formed based on Skill, Rule, and Knowledge (SRK) concept by Rasmussen [20] . The procedurebased human behavior that is instructed by a stored rule is a typical rule-based behavior in safety-critical domains. In order to relate the SRK principle to probabilistic risk assessment framework, Swain and Guttmann [21] had articulated the use of a Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) for nuclear applications. The THERP is referred to as the first generation of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) method, which is still remaining popular and well suited for event modeling and procedural task assessment [22] . Based on Swain's pioneering work, many newer second-generation HRA methods such as Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM), A Technique for Human Event Analysis (ATHEANA), Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Human Reliability Assessment (SPAR-H), Success Likelihood Index Methodology, MultiAttribute Utility Decomposition (SLIM-MAUD) etc. have been proposed after the release of report WASH-1400 in 1975 [23] - [27] . Comparative to the older methods (i.e., THERP), these second-generation HRA methods focus more on the cognitive mechanisms and context causing human errors rather than just the execution errors. Typical examples include E. Hollnagel's context-dependent cognitive model (process-related cognitive model) used for human performance prediction [23] , A. Mosleh's team-centered version of the information, decision, and action cognitive model (cognitive simulation model) used for decision-making and problem-solving [28] , etc. In addition, Boring [29] explored the role of performance shaping factors across different stages of human reliability analysis. Hara [30] applied human performance models to simulate human behaviors and predict human performances in support of human reliability analysis.
The human behaviors in cognitive information processing of detection, diagnosis, planning and action can be modeled to some extent by the stimulus-organism-response paradigm in human reliability analysis [31] , [32] . However, most of the first and second generation HRA methods have featured largely static task analysis. The need for dynamic modeling and uncertainty reduction has inspired the emergency of simulation-based HRA methods. The simulationbased HRA, also known as the dynamic HRA, is called the third-generation HRA methods on the basis of dynamic human performance simulation [33] . The simulation and modeling with HRA provide a new perspective and thought to account for the dynamic nature of human performance with the inclusion of realistic deterministic safety analysis. In an integrated IJS-HRA method presented by Prosek and Cepin [34] , the deterministic safety analysis is performed as a parametric input for determining the success criteria time windows of operator actions for human reliability analysis. Also, a depend HRA method is developed by Cepin [35] based on the integration of various features of existing methods and experiences from full scope plant simulators, by which the dependencies between tasks with human performances in Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) can be modeled. Kelly [36] presented a process mining tool to aid in the analysis of simulator observations in support of human reliability task analysis. Under the model-based human reliability analysis framework developed by Mosleh et al. [37] and Coyne and Mosleh [38] , an Accident Dynamic Simulator is paired with Information, Decision, and Action in a Crew context cognitive model (ADS-IDAC) to provide a variety of contextual information and realistic operator responses.
Although the evolution and advances of HRA methods offer a dynamic basis for human factor modeling and quantification, substantial efforts should still be undertaken to assure an efficient and complete capture of human performance [39] . Especially for the feasibility and acceptability of human action sequence, there exists very limited body of literature on this problem [40] , [41] . In report NUREG-1852 [42] , the criteria and associated technical bases for evaluating the feasibility and reliability of postfire operator manual actions implemented in nuclear power plants are provided from a deterministic perspective. A task analysis technique was proposed by Annett [43] originally for training process control tasks, but now it is widely used in the human error analysis and interface design [44] . As an important link to any comprehensive human reliability analysis, task analysis is used to examine the ways by which plant operators perform particular tasks. The feasibility and reliability of the human actions can thus be demonstrated qualitatively using task analysis guidelines. Also, a literature review conducted by Bolton et al. [45] shows that the emerging model-driven system design and analysis techniques apply formal system models (including models of cognitively driven human behavior and task analytic behavior) to capture both the human cognition and task behavior and evaluate its impacts on system safety using model checker. On that basis, Pan and Bolton [46] presented an extended formal method to model the human collaborative procedures in the context of a task analytic modeling formalism and use model checking to evaluate the safety of procedures with erroneous human behaviors. The formal system models represent the human-system behavior in a mathematical formalism such as finite state machine, by which verification process can be performed with exhaustive search of the system state space to prove that system properties adhere to specification. Wakefield et al. [47] presented a Revised Systematic Human Action Reliability Procedure (SHARP1) method to provide guidance for carrying out simple task analysis as well as for documenting the walk-throughs and the feasibility of the recovery actions relevant to task.
The concern of this study is the feasibility of human activity recognition. In the study, the feasibility of operator manual action is defined as the degree to which plant safety is maintained even with erroneous human behaviors. The feasibility implies that the adverse impacts resulted from operator manual action on plant safety (reliability or risk metrics) should meet the risk acceptability criteria. The erroneous human behavior refers to that the human operator does not follow the normative procedures for interacting with system dynamics [48] . Hereafter, the term feasibility is also interchanged with acceptability or operability concerning human performance. In principle, the feasibility study of VOLUME 7, 2019 human manual action can be performed in both retrospective and proactive modes. The focus of this paper is on the retrospective operational audit concerning with erroneous human behaviors. A reliability-based mapping scheme with GO-FLOW is presented in this paper for operational audit by incorporating practice of human behaviors into system dynamic scenario planning process. The GO-FLOW method is a success-oriented technique for system safety and reliability analysis. It should be noted that the key benefit of utilization of GO-FLOW method for feasibility study of operator manual action is the ability to incorporate dynamic modeling of task sequence into overall reliability of complex systems and allow for model-based screening of novel system configurations. Surely, the integration of other dynamic modeling techniques also works in some aspects of HRA problemsolving. As noted earlier, the simulation-based dynamic HRA applies frequentist approach such as Monte Carlo style replications to calculation of human error probability on the basis of human performance estimation [33] . Besides, Bayesian network causal models are widely used for dependency assessment among human failure events and parameter updating [49] , [50] . These HRA methods do account for dependency, but there are also significant variabilities in the level of task decomposition adopted across analyses and adjustments should be anticipated to make it compatible with certain HRA methods. [33] . Since the cognitive causality modeling and performance modeling for human behavior are out the scope of this paper, it is not discussed in detail here.
The GO-FLOW methodology [51] is a technique capable of dynamic safety and reliability analysis of large technological systems and process. The major advantages of GO-FLOW method are the abilities to easily: 1) handle complex operational sequence and time-dependent mission problems [52] , 2) support common cause failure analysis and sensitivity analysis with uncertainties [53] , [54] , 3) represent system configuration changes, engineering functions and system dynamic scenarios, 4) capture human activities and on-off operations amongst systems components. Using the GO-FLOW method, the practice of human behaviors can be incorporated into the system dynamic process to assess their impacts on system safety performance. Thus, potential human errors and associated system configurations are about to be identified through the reliability-based mapping scheme. As a graphical modeling tool, the GO-FLOW has been applied to a wide range of applications, such as elevator safety analysis [55] , risk analysis of dynamic behavior of nuclear power plant under severe accident condition [56] , Living PSA [57] reliability monitor [58] and risk monitor [59] , etc. In 2012, T. Matsuoka applied the GO-FLOW method for quantitative evaluation of operator team's response in a pressurized water reactor incident [61] . A recent GO-FLOW application presented by the authors is concentrating on the operational risk supervision at nuclear power plants [60] . The operational risk supervision is principally concerned with impact assessment of integration of safety system operations and manual missions. While the focus of this paper is put on the operational audit analysis for underlying human error identification.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The GO-FLOW method is firstly introduced in Section II. Then a reliability-based mapping scheme is presented for proactively and retroactively assessing the human factors issues. Section III presents a simulated operator action-involved event for illustrating the post-hoc reviewing analysis of underlying erroneous human behavior. The reliability modeling and mapping analysis process for erroneous human behavior identification is presented in Section IV. Discussions and conclusions are made in Section V.
II. RELIABILITY-BASED MAPPING SCHEME FOR ERRONEOUS HUMAN BEHAVIOR RECOGNITION USING GO-FLOW METHOD A. FUNDAMENTALS OF GO-FLOW METHOD
In conventional GO-FLOW method, fourteen operators are defined for describing the signal transmissions, functional performances, and logical relations of structures, systems and components. The GO-FLOW operators are connected by signals, which include main input signal, sub-input signal and final signal. By introducing the concept of signal flow, the analogy of fluid flow and information flow in actual engineering systems can be modeled by GO-FLOW chart. The existence of signal including both the actual and potential existence is quantified by the intensity of a signal. The intensity is generally referring to the probability of signal existence. Sometimes it also means time information when the sub-input signals of Type-35, 37 or 38 GO-FLOW operators are measured. The definition of GO-FLOW operators and signal lines is presented in Fig.1 . In this paper, the GO-FLOW method is chosen as the modeling and analysis tool for the following reasons. (1) All possible system and component states can be modeled within one GO-FLOW chart. The binary-state component (fail state and function state) is usually modeled by Type-21 GO-FLOW operator. The Type-21 GO-FLOW operator can be also applied to capture the human manual actions in terms of fixed probability assignment. With the utilization of Type-25 GO-FLOW operator (also known as the signal generator), the outcome results of detailed human cognitive-behavioral model can be incorporated into the GO-FLOW analysis. On the other hand, the various operations of system equipment (i.e., opening and closing of a valve) are readily captured using the Type-26, 27, and 39 GO-FLOW operators. Beyond the demand failure analysis, the aging effects and recovery actions (maintenance strategies) can be modeled at the same time by Type-35, 37, and 38 GO-FLOW operators. The point probability is used to estimate the specific functions or operations of physical component at successive time series.
(2) The GO-FLOW model allows the existence of multiple final signals to represent multiple possible task/operational sequences. The signal propagation delay can be also simulated with a Type-28 GO-FLOW operator.
(3) The GO-FLOW is easy to represent time-dependent operational sequences by introducing the concept of time point. The flexible interpretation of discrete time points allows GO-FLOW method to model complex dynamic characteristics.
(4) Phased mission analysis along with system configuration changes can be easily treated by GO-FLOW method. A particular Type-40 GO-FLOW operator is created in GO-FLOW for freezing and calculating signal intensity during different phased missions.
(5) The integrated analysis toolkit of GO-FLOW supports a comprehensive analysis of complex engineering systems with full consideration of human-procedure-system interactions.
B. RELIABILITY-BASED MAPPING SCHEME FOR ERRONEOUS HUMAN BEHAVIOR RECOGNITION
As shown in Fig. 2 , a reliability-based mapping scheme for erroneous human behavior is proposed. The reliability-based mapping scheme can be implemented for both retrospective and proactive assessment of human factors issues.
The process for erroneous human behavior identification involves in three levels of analysis.
(1) Task/operational sequence analysis. The task/ operational sequence is elicited from system operation logs, standard operating procedures, or operation planning. The task sequence generated based on the operating procedure analysis is taken as the normative sample for a reference. For the retrospective operation auditing analysis, the actual operational sequence is extracted from historical operation logs. While hypothetical operation plans are used for operational sequence analysis in prediction of potential human errors. The differences among the operational sequence patterns can be applied to abnormity detection.
(2) Human response action configuration and associated system configuration management analysis. The operational reliability and risk are affected mainly by human factors and associated system configuration changes. It is therefore that the various sources of risk must be treated explicitly for accurately mapping out the potential erroneous human behaviors and response action configuration changes. The purpose of conducting human-system configuration management analysis is to determine the state changes of system equipment during mission tasks. Then the impacts resulted from human-system configuration changes on operational reliability and risk can be clearly clarified.
(3) Reliability-based mapping analysis. The reliability modeling and analysis of system dynamic behaviors augmenting with human action sequence are performed for comparative mapping analysis. The impacts of human factors on overall safety performance of system are evaluated using GO-FLOW method. The potential erroneous human behaviors are expected to be recognized by the comparative mapping analysis among reliability profiles of different task sequences.
In this study, the retrospective human factors analysis is focused for operation auditing purpose. The reliability-based mapping scheme is applied to the post-hoc reviewing analysis for identifying the underlying human error event. 
III. CASE EXAMPLE
In this Section, a case event of loss of dual residual heat removal pumps occurred during the training design of nuclear power plant is taken as an example for human error recognition using the reliability-based mapping scheme. The case event scenario was conducted on a training simulator of China Advanced Pressurized Reactor (CPR 1000). The scripted simulation analysis results are used in this study for case description of manual operation error recognition. In the example case study, both sequences of residual heat removal pumps were forced to shut down due to insufficient component cooling during the refueling outage of nuclear power plant. The case event starts with a low water level alarm in a buffer tank of Component Cooling Water System (CCWS). The evolution of event involves a series of operator manual action decisions regarding the causal dynamic interactions between the Component Cooling Water System/Essential Service Water System (CCWS/ESWS) and its supported Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) and other safety-critical system equipment. The detailed system description and event scenario description are presented in the subsequent sub-section III-A and III-B, respectively.
A. COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM/ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM
Component cooling water system and essential service water system play a key role in ensuring the cooling of nuclear island [62] . The main function of component cooling water system is to remove the decay heat from primary coolant system by the cooling of safety injection, residual heat removal pumps and heat exchangers in the reactor normal cooling phase or during incident or accident conditions. The essential service water system indirectly contributes to maintain the primary fluid inventory by cooling via component cooling water system. The essential service water system must ensure sufficient heat transfer from component cooling water system and provide appropriate cooling water to component cooling water system when necessary. To ensure the successful operation of system, at least one of CCWS/ESWS train lines should be normally working to provide sufficient cooling capacity for different loads in various operational and maintenance tasks. Fig. 3 shows the main parts of component cooling water system in the simulated CPR 1000 reactor design. In this case example, the component cooling water system is required to provide continuous cooling service to residual heat removal system for decay heat removal during the refueling stage of nuclear power plant. The thermal barriers of residual heat removal pumps in place must be sufficiently cooled to ensure the integrity of pump seals and the integrity of residual heat removal system.
As shown in Fig. 3 , the component cooling water system comprises two circulating cooling lines, which are respectively marked as train A and train B. Each train line consists of two centrifugal CCWS pumps, two CCWS/ESWS heat exchangers where their shell sides are cooled by the filtered cold water supplying from essential service water system, and inter-train motorized isolation valves for separating the internal RHRS pumps from external common load equipment such as reactor coolant pumps, and control rod drive mechanism etc. In order to ensure the cooling capacity for safety classified systems in the event of partial loss of cooling water, the safety features support automatic or manual switchover of the cooling of component cooling water system to a standby train line. In the meantime, the essential service water system will supply makeup water to component cooling water system automatically when the water level in buffer tanks becomes low.
B. EVENT SCENARIO DESCRIPTION OBTAINED FROM OPERATION LOGS
The event scenario assumed for the example case study is described and summarized in Table 1 . In the example case event of loss of both RHRS pumps considered for this study, the abnormity of water level in CCWS tanks as well as the abnormal operation of RHRS pumps are uncovered by a real-time information monitoring platform based on the online data tracking in operation logs. The event scenario is assumed to start at time 00:00:00. The low water level alarm firstly appeared in CCWS tank 002BT. Subsequently, valve 002VN was turned on to supply the makeup water to CCWS train B. The RHRS pump 002PO was shut down at time 00:01:01 when the water level in CCWS tank 002BT reached to the triggering point of distress level alarm. The CCWS was logically switched over from train B to train A after the distress water level alarm occurred. Shortly after CCWS train A put into operation, the water level of CCWS tank 001BT was also followed by a sharp decline. The high risk raised by the sharp drop in water level caused the RHRS pump 001PO to stop too. In the end, both RHRS pumps were forced to be shut down for about 6 minutes due to the insufficient cooling capacity.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF RELIABILITY-BASED MAPPING ANALYSIS FOR ERRONEOUS HUMAN BEHAVIOR RECOGNITION A. OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE ANALYSIS
According to the operation logs and event scenario described in Table 1 , the operational sequence of the actual event scenario can be obtained. The operational sequence is described by a state transition diagram, which is shown in Fig. 4 . Within the state transition diagram, the system behaviors interacting with human activities can be explicitly modeled and interpreted by a set of system functional states and its state changes in response to outside events. A total of eleven system states in a time series are elicited from the historical VOLUME 7, 2019 operation logs. The time sequence is used to represent the evolution of system states for dynamic reliability analysis by GO-FLOW method.
The task sequence elicited from standard operating procedures for handling the water level anomaly in CCWS tanks is presented in Fig. 5 . As per standard operating procedures, the basic behavioral process of detection, diagnosis, planning and action execution ought to be implemented once the plant operators find there is any anomalies in the CCWS/ESWS system. The main diagnostic and response process are formulated in the task sequence. The sketched task sequence can be understood as a simplification of the standard operating procedures. Similarly, time tags are used to describe the possible normative scenarios.
In the example event scenario, the CCWS train B is initially working with valves 010VN and 013VN in open state. When the water level of CCWS tank 002BT decreases to 1.25m (the triggering point for low water level alarm), an alarm signal is sent to the main control room monitor panel. In response, the plant operators are required to carry out a thorough check for potential leaks on CCWS system as per standard operating procedures. The diagnostic process plays an important role in ensuring the execution of follow-up response actions correctly. In the implementation of task sequence formulated by standard operating procedure (See Fig. 5 ), the valve 002VN is turned on in the first place for providing makeup water out of ESWS system to recover sufficient water supply. For the subsequent diagnostic analysis of loss of CCWS/ESWS water supply sequence, there are two possible envisioned scenarios that will be developed under the condition of water supply to the external common loop. If the cooling water of external common loop is supplied by CCWS train B, then the common loop should be isolated by closing the valves 010VN, 011VN, 012VN and 013VN. Leaks on external common loop can be diagnosed and confirmed on the condition that the water level in CCWS tank 002BT continues to drop. The CCWS train B can be put back to service after leaks on common loop has been identified and isolated. Or else, leakage is concluded on the internal loop of CCWS train B. Then the system has to be switched over to a standby train line (CCWS train A).
By comparing and analyzing the operational sequence and task sequence of loss of CCWS train B as outlined in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 , we can find that the plant operators did not follow the standard operating procedures to conduct a complete diagnostic analysis before switching over to the standby water supply sequence. In actual situation, the plant operators took it for granted to switch over to CCWS train A immediately after loss of CCWS train B. The plant operators seem too preoccupied by the consistent cooling water supply to RHRS pumps but skipped over the diagnosis process for dramatic drop in water level of CCWS tank 002BT. Purely from a practical alarm response point of view, an error of omission occurs when the plant operators should do but fail to perform a diagnosis analysis in the task sequence.
B. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION ANALYSIS
During the execution of task sequence, the system configuration changes due to the outages and switchover of system components. The system configuration changes occurred in actual event scenario is shown in Fig. 6 . As shown in Fig. 6 , the names of system components involved in CCWS/ESWS system operation are listed in the left-hand column. The time points are tagged on the top of the system configuration management area. The system components are put in and out of service successively in the implementation of event response. The statuses of system components are denoted by color bars across the time series. The color green means that system components are in operation service. While out of service state (referring to standby state) is represented by gray bars. For example, the valve 002VN is forced to turn on at time point T3 for delivering makeup water to CCWS train B. The valves 010VN and 013 VN are isolated and valves 011VN and 012VN are opened by plant operators when the CCWS train B is switched over to train A. The cooling function of CCWS/ESWS system was completely lost at time point T10 and this situation had lasted for about 6 minutes.
In the meantime, the system component configuration changes extracted from the standard operating procedures in the case of leaks on the common loop of CCWS/ESWS system is presented in Fig. 7 . The pre-set system configuration is managed in a similar way as compared to the actual system configuration changes as shown in Fig. 6 . In the study, the specific envision scenario that the cooling water of common loop is supplied by CCWS train B and the leak happens to be located on the common loop is considered for comparison analysis. According to the task sequence presented in Fig. 5, the valve 002VN is the first to open  and then valves 010VN, 011VN, 012VN , and 013VN are all isolated to check for possible leaks on the common loop. The whole CCWS train B is out of service during the diagnostic process from time point T4 to T5 but returns in service after troubleshooting at time point T5.
By comparison, we find that the observed system configuration changes in actual situation (See in Fig. 6 ) is evidently to depart from the pre-set system configuration changes as per standard operating procedures (See in Fig. 7 ). As shown in Fig. 7 , the system configuration changes occurring during the standard scenario can be simply characterized by a sequence of 6 discrete time points. The task steps involved in the event response in pre-set envision scenario is implemented with more preciseness and purposes than that of the actual situation. Some unnecessary mitigation actions (e.g., errors of commission and omission) can be avoided if the common loop leak is early diagnosed.
C. SYSTEM RELIABILITY-BASED MAPPING ANALYSIS
In this Section, the GO-FLOW method is applied to model and evaluate the reliability of system dynamic behaviors in response to the event of loss of CCWS/ESWS system quantitatively. The GO-FLOW model can be built directly from system flow diagram (See in Fig. 3 ). The GO-FLOW model generated for the CCWS/ESWS system is shown in Fig. 8 .
As shown in Fig. 8 , the water sources, e.g., the water storage in CCWS tank 001BT, 002BT as well as water flows from ESWS (mass flows) are represented by Type-25 GO-FLOW operators. The control information such as automatic and manual control signals are generated from the signal generator (Type-25 GO-FLOW operators) as well. The human error probability is implicitly considered in the value field setting for signal intensity. The sophisticated human reliability analysis model can be also integrated into the GO-FLOW model for evaluating the impacts of human psychological and behavioral factors on system safety performance. The normal operating function of CCWS tanks, cooling branches and common loop is described by parameter Pg (probability of components in good state) in Type-21 GO-FLOW operator. The normally closed valves 001VN and 002VN are modeled by Type-26 GO-FLOW operator, which is supplied with a sub-input signal to control the opening action of valves. The Type-39 GO-FLOW operator is used to represent the frequent start and stop of on-off components such as CCWS pumps, RHRS pumps and isolating valves 010VN to 013VN. In the case study, the impacts of aging failure of active components on system reliability are also taken into account for a comprehensive analysis. The operating failure of redundant CCWS pumps and RHRS pumps over time is characterized by Type-35 GO-FLOW operator. The chronic failure process of heat exchangers of CCWS/ESWS system is modeled by Type-37 GO-FLOW operator. Note that the sub-input signal of Type-35 GO-FLOW operator and Type-37 GO-FLOW operator does not mean the actual signal flow but represents the time interval. The final signal out of No. 75 GO-FLOW operator (OR gate) implies that at least one of the CCWS train line is available for providing cooling water to safety-critical equipment (success criteria). Table 2 shows the reliability data used for GO-FLOW analysis. The operation and failure data are stemmed from IAEA's recommendation for illustrative purpose only [63] . In Table 2 , the CCWS tanks, cooling branches, common loop, and heat exchangers are passive components, which have no need of power sources to their actuations. The probability of these passive components in good condition is assumed to be Pg = 0.99999. The other system components i.e., CCWS pumps, motorized valves 010VN∼013VN are active components. The open and close actions of active components are calculated by probability of failure on demand (Po/Pc). The operating failure of system components over time is calculated with failure rate λ op .
Using the reliability data presented in Table 2 , the standard scenario and actual scenario developed for the event of water leaks on common loop of CCWS/ESWS system can be analyzed by the GO-FLOW model. The failure probabilities and reliability profiles of CCWS/ESWS system in both standard and actual scenario analysis are presented in Table 3 and Fig. 9 . The different system operational sequences configured for standard and actual scenarios are adopted in the same GO-FLOW model for comparison analysis. The updating of system configuration changes can be simply achieved by parameter settings.
As shown in Fig.9 , substantial variations can be observed in system reliability profiles as the scenario progresses over time. The significant fluctuations occurred to the system failure probabilities are largely due to operator response action configuration changes (manifested as system configuration changes). The operator response action configuration changes act up to the basic process of operator's situation assessment, judgement and action execution. The plant operators are required to take reasonable actions and configure system components to fulfil the intended system functions or missions in any particular situations.
In Case I of standard scenario, plant operators are required to isolate the common loop for leak localization once low water level alarm is triggered in CCWS tanks. The failure VOLUME 7, 2019 TABLE 2. Reliability data for GO-FLOW analysis (stemmed from IAEA' report [63] ).
FIGURE 9.
Reliability profiles of CCWS/ESWS system in both standard and actual scenario analysis.
probability of CCWS/ESWS system in Case I rises slightly at time point T3 as the common loop is isolated, and then shoots up to a peak value at time point T4 when CCWS train B is put out of service. The system failure probability falls back to a baseline level at time point T5 when CCWS train B returns to operation service. Thereafter, the aging effects are mapped by the gent increases in system failure probability.
The reliability of CCWS/ESWS system undergoes several big variations in Case II of actual scenario as well. The system failure probability bumps up twice in correspondence with the system configuration changes. The first straight climb occurs at time point T5 when CCWS train B is forced to be shut off. The other sharp rise presents at time point T10 when both CCWS train A and B become unavailable. We observed that the great differences between system reliability profiles in both standard and actual scenarios are mainly caused by the imparity in response action configurations. Therefore, the underlying human errors and erroneous response action sequence can be identified through comparative mapping analysis of system reliability profiles between the standard and actual scenarios. The reliability profile obtained for standard task sequence and associated system configuration changes that are elaborated from standard operating procedures is used as a reference line and compared with the actual system reliability profile. Any significant deviations (exclusion of slight variations resulted from aging effects) from the standard line will be reviewed for erroneous human behavior identification. In the case study, the underlying human errors and erroneous response action configurations are reflected by the great divergences on reliability profiles across time T3 to T5 from a quantitative point of view. It is obvious that the actual operation sequence has been diverged from the planned and normative response action sequence. Thus, human error of omission (lack of diagnosis in the case analysis) can be recognized by the quantitative reliability mapping analysis in combination with the qualitative operation log auditing analysis.
V. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, a reliability-based mapping scheme augmenting with operation log review analysis is presented for erroneous operator behavior identification. The abnormal system behaviors and human activities are detected with the operation log auditing analysis. The underlying human errors can be further mapped out through comparative mapping analysis between the standard and actual scenarios. The reliabilitybased mapping scheme is implemented and illustrated with an example case event of loss of both RHRS pumps in a simulated pressurized water reactor using GO-FLOW method. The case analysis shows that the GO-FLOW method is suitable for representing human action and system configuration changes in different task sequences. The underlying erroneous human behaviors and associated system configuration changes can be effectively reflected via the changes in system reliability profile. The future of work is unfolding from following aspects.
(1) The reliability-based mapping scheme implemented in this study is mainly surrounding by the retrospective analysis of human errors for operation auditing and investigation purposes. While the scheme can be also applied to predict the potential human errors proactively. Unlike the retroactive analysis, the already occurred event scenario will be replaced by a set of planned operational scenarios (or preset response action configurations) for comparative mapping with the standard scenario based on system reliability prediction profiles. The purpose of proactive analysis of human errors is about to give more attentions on the online safety monitoring and management.
(2) The reliability-based mapping scheme presented in the paper is aiming for uncovering of underlying erroneous human behaviors and associated response action configurations from a quantitative angle. Our next goal is to integrate the reliability-based mapping scheme with system state inference analysis for a more comprehensive operational feasibility and acceptability assessment from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives.
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